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ABSTRACT
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) invited a group of experts to 
The Hague to clarify the meaning and scope of the notion of “direct participation in 
hostilities” (DPH) in 2003.1 This attempt took more time than expected and produced 
the ICRC’s Interpretative Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities 
under International Humanitarian Law (the Interpretative Guidance) in May 2009.2 
However, the outcome of this entire process lacks consensus among the experts who 
participated in the working group meetings3 as a significant number of them are of 
the opinion that the Interpretative Guidance does not correctly maintain the balance 
between military necessity and humanitarian concerns.4 Because the ICRC’s formulation 
of DPH is not in accordance with this generally accepted balance, which reflects the 
spirit of all international humanitarian law (IHL) norms, the Interpretative Guidance has 
been widely criticized by legal experts and scholars as will be discussed in this essay. 
Keywords: the International Committee of the Red Cross, Direct Participation in 
Hostilities, International Armed Conflicts, Non-international Armed Conflicts.
ÖZET
Uluslararası Kızılhaç Komitesi, “çatışmalara doğrudan katılım” kavramının anlam 
ve kapsamını netleştirmek için 2003 yılında, uzmanlardan oluşan bir grubu Lahey’e 
davet etti. Bu teşebbüs, beklenenden uzun bir zaman aldı ve 2009 yılının Mayıs ayında 
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1 ICRC, Overview of the ICRC’s Expert Process (2003-2008), at 3, available at https://www.
icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/overview-of-the-icrcs-expert-process-icrc.pdf (last visited 
30 December 2015).
2 ICRC, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under 
International Humanitarian Law (Nils Melzer ed., 2009), available at https://www.icrc.org/
eng/assets/files/other/icrc-002-0990.pdf (last visited 30 December 2015). 
3 ICRC, Overview, supra note 1, at 4.
4 Schmitt, “The Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities: A 
Critical Analysis”, 1 Harv. Nat’l Sec. J. (2010) 5, at 6.
The ICRC’s Formulation of the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities: A Critical Legal Analysis
Res. Asst. Lokman Burak ÇETİNKAYA
362 Law & Justice Review, Year:7, Issue:12, June 2016
Uluslararası Kızılhaç Komitesi, “Uluslararası İnsancıl Hukuk’ta Çatışmalara Doğrudan 
Katılım Kavramına İlişkin Yorumlayıcı Kılavuz”u yayınladı. Ancak çalışma toplantılarına 
katılan uzmanların büyük bir bölümünün, Yorumlayıcı Kılavuz’un askeri gereksinim 
ve insani kaygı arasındaki dengeyi doğru şekilde kuramadığı düşüncesinde oldukları 
ve bütün bu süreç boyunca uzmanlar arasında fikir birliği sağlanamadığı görüldü. 
Uluslararası Kızılhaç Komitesi’nin çatışmalara doğrudan katılıma ilişkin ortaya koyduğu 
çerçevenin Uluslararası İnsancıl Hukuk kurallarının ruhunu yansıtan bu genel kabul 
görmüş dengeye uygun olmaması, Yorumlayıcı Kılavuz’un, bu makalede ele alındığı 
üzere, hukukçular ve akademisyenler tarafından ciddi bir biçimde eleştirilmesine neden 
oldu. 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Uluslararası Kızılhaç Komitesi, Çatışmalara Doğrudan Katılım, 
Uluslararası Silahlı Çatışmalar, Uluslararası Olmayan Silahlı Çatışmalar. 
♦♦♦♦
I. Concept of “civilian” in the context of direct participation in hostilities: 
membership approach vs. functional criteria
The principle of distinction is enshrined in Articles 48, 51(2) and 52(2) of 
Additional Protocol I (AP I)5 and requires parties to a conflict to distinguish 
peaceful civilians from members of organized armed groups and those taking 
a direct part in hostilities. Although Additional Protocol II (AP II)6 includes a 
prohibition on making civilians the object of attack in Article 13(2), it does not 
directly refer to the principle of distinction. However, the jurisprudence of the 
International Court of Justice, of the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights, and of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
clearly reveals that the principle of distinction is of customary character in both 
international and non-international armed conflicts and is one of the cardinal 
principles of IHL.7 
Determining who qualifies as a civilian is not only important in terms of 
the principle of distinction, but also necessary for DPH as this only applies to 
civilians. This will be explained separately in relation to international armed 
conflicts and non-international armed conflicts.
5 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 12 December 1977, 1125 UNTS 3. 
6 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of Non-international Armed Conflicts, 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 609. 
7 International Court of Justice, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory 
Opinion, 8 July 1996, paras. 78-79; Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Case 
11.137 (Argentina), Report, 18 November, 1997, para. 177; International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgement, 3 March 
2000, para. 180.
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A. International armed conflicts
According to Article 50 (2) AP I, civilians are defined negatively under 
the membership approach as those who are not members of regular armed 
forces of State or irregular armed forces such as militia, voluntary corps, and 
paramilitary armed forces integrated into State armed forces, or levée en 
masse (resistance movements) belonging to a party to the conflict. According 
to this approach, civilians can be determined by simply distinguishing them 
negatively from members of listed groups. However, as required in non-
international armed conflicts, the Interpretative Guidance proposes the same 
functional criteria used to determine the members of irregular armed forces 
(discussed below) also be applied to international armed conflicts. 
B. Non-international armed conflicts
Civilians in non-international armed conflicts can also simply be defined as 
all those who are not members of organized armed groups whether State or 
non-State in character. Although the ICRC accepted this approach at the first 
meeting in 2003 and in its Customary International Law Study,8 it then came 
to a different conclusion in its Interpretative Guidance. The Interpretative 
Guidance provides a distinction between State armed forces and non-State 
organized armed groups when establishing membership. According to this, 
as domestic laws generally do not regulate the membership to non-State 
organized armed groups and such membership occasionally hinges on an act 
of official integration or identification, only those individuals performing a 
“continuous combat function” should be considered as members of non-State 
organized armed groups.9 Therefore individuals who do not continuously 
participate in hostilities and individuals who exercise non-combat function 
such as political and administrative personnel, recruiters, trainers, financiers, 
propagandists, weapon suppliers, manufacturers, smugglers, and intelligence 
collectors are not qualified as members of non-State organized armed groups 
and remain civilians.10 
First of all, since the above listed persons who performed the same function 
would still be targetable as members of State armed forces, States will never 
accept such a higher threshold that benefits non-State organized armed 
groups. It is also illogical to introduce such a double standard that asks what 
functions members of non-State organized armed groups are performing, 
but does not ask the same question for members of State armed forces. Why 
8 ICRC, Customary International Humanitarian Law, Vol. 1 (Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck eds., 
4th ed. 2005) at 19. 
9 ICRC, Interpretative Guidance, supra note 2, at 34-35. 
10 Idem, at 31, 36.
The ICRC’s Formulation of the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities: A Critical Legal Analysis
Res. Asst. Lokman Burak ÇETİNKAYA
364 Law & Justice Review, Year:7, Issue:12, June 2016
should the cook of a non-State organized armed group be treated differently 
from the cook of a State armed force based on the function criterion? It should 
always be kept in mind that IHL must be applicable to parties to a conflict 
equally; otherwise no commander will be able to convince his fighters to 
comply with the rules. Secondly, the function criterion does not satisfactorily 
define civilians. For instance, when you see someone preparing a meal, does it 
mean that this person is doing this 24/7? It is almost impossible to distinguish 
the respective function someone has in a group. Thirdly, the Interpretative 
Guidance has inaccurate qualification of levée en masse as neither civilians 
nor members of the armed forces that does not based on any treaty or 
customary rule.11 In conclusion, the ICRC seems to be trying to establish a 
new rule by introducing the term “continuous combat function”, which is not 
even found in treaty law, rather than correctly reflecting customary law in the 
determination of who is a civilian. Therefore, the distinctive criterion in the 
definition of civilians should be non-membership of both organized armed 
groups whether State or non-State in character and levée en masse regardless 
of any functional criteria that is proposed by the ICRC for non-State organized 
armed groups. 
II. Constitutive elements of direct participation in hostilities 
It should be noted from the beginning that as long as there is no sufficient 
reliable information on whether a specific civilian’s conduct qualifies as DPH, 
the conduct must be presumed as not amounting to DPH in accordance with 
the rule of doubt.12 Therefore an individual enjoys protection as a civilian 
unless his conduct amounts to DPH without doubt. 
The Interpretative Guidance requires the following three criteria to be met 
cumulatively in order for the conduct of an individual to qualify as DPH. 
A. Threshold of harm
The threshold of harm required for conduct to qualify as DPH in hostilities 
would not only be reached by inflicting damage, destruction, killing, or injury, 
but also by adversely affecting the military operations or military capacity of 
a party to the conflict by, for example, depriving of the military use of certain 
objects, equipment or territory.13 However, merely inconveniencing the 
enemy does not meet the threshold. The likely consequence of an act must be 
of sufficiently severe in order to reach the required threshold. However, this 
11 Idem, at 25. 
12 Idem, at 75.
13 Idem, at 48.
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ambiguous threshold is criticized by Bosch14 due to the fact that it is under-
inclusive and unduly difficult to satisfy. 
The Interpretative Guidance states that if a specific act is designed to, 
or capable of, inflicting harm that meets the threshold, then it is irrelevant 
whether the harm materializes or not.15 Therefore, the consideration of the 
first criterion should be the objective likelihood of the act to result in such 
harm. 
B. Direct causation
It is correctly stated in the Interpretative Guidance that “there must be a 
direct causal link between the act and the harm likely to result either from 
that act, or from a coordinated military operation of which that act constitutes 
an integral part.”16 The term “likely” means that which can be reasonably 
expected to result from an act in the prevailing circumstances.17 Contrary to 
the position taken in the Interpretative Guidance, the term “direct” should 
be understood as a sufficiently close causal relation.18 However, the ICRC 
took this concept a step further and interpreted the direct causal link quite 
narrowly by introducing the concept of “one causal step” 19 and by excluding 
all uninterrupted causal chains of events.20 According to this, there is no 
direct causal link between the act of assembling improvised explosive devices 
(IEDs) and the harm likely to result from that act.21 It is clear that the ICRC 
in its Interpretative Guidance strived to limit the scope of DPH, but has not 
reflected reality. Although the ICRC’s notion of one causal step may make 
sense in theory, as has been indicated by Boothby,22 it is difficult to apply this 
notion in practice because attacks in modern conflicts are achieved through 
a multiplicity of integrated steps. The ICRC’s approach has also been rightly 
criticized by Watkin23 as such a narrow interpretation of the rule creates a 
14 Bosch, “The International Humanitarian Law Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities - A 
Review of the ICRC Interpretive Guide and Subsequent Debate” 17 Potchefstroom Elec. L.J. 
(2014) 998, at 1011. 
15 ICRC, Interpretative Guidance, supra note 2, at 47. 
16 Idem, at 51.
17 Idem, at 47.
18 Van Der Toorn, “‘Direct Participation in Hostilities’: A Legal and Practical Road Test of the 
International Committee of the Red Cross’s Guidance through Afghanistan” 17 Austl. Int’l 
L.J. (2010) 7, at 24. 
19 ICRC, Interpretative Guidance, supra note 2, at 53.
20 Idem, at 54.
21 Ibid. 
22 Boothby, “Direct Participation in Hostilities - A Discussion of the ICRC Interpretive 
Guidance” 1 J. Int’l Human. Legal Stud. (2010) 143, at 159.
23 Watkin, “Opportunity Lost: Organized Armed Groups and The ICRC ‘Direct Participation in 
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major threat against both civilians and security forces. As has been stated 
by Dinstein,24 equipping the enemy with specific means of harm, such as 
assembling IEDs or transporting certain equipment not too remotely from 
combat operations to persons who plan to attack somewhere, may also qualify 
as DPH. Therefore, direct causality should not be limited to the notion of “one 
causal step”. However, it does not mean that indirect causalities should be 
included. As has been rightly stated by Van Der Toorn,25 the term “direct” 
should be understood as sufficiently close causal relations according to the 
facts on the ground.
Before passing on to the issue of human shields, one more controversial 
thing needs to be clarified about the assembly of IEDs. One may ask what 
distinguishes the person who assembles IEDs from the munitions factory 
worker. As has been indicated by Dinstein,26 the worker does not specifically 
know when, where, and against whom the munitions will be used, but the 
person who assembles IEDs is much more closely linked to the actual delivery 
of the device to the objective. 
The issue of human shields was another point that led to disagreement 
during the expert meetings.27 In the context of human shields, the ICRC says 
that acting voluntarily and deliberately as a human shield in order to create a 
physical obstacle to military operations of the adversary can satisfy the direct 
causation criterion,28 but, if the shield amounts only to a legal obstacle to 
military operations of the adversary, it is not causally direct.29 However, there 
is no rule under IHL that requires such distinction. Schmitt criticizes30 the ICRC’s 
view and indicates that the legal obstacle is often even more effective than 
the physical one. He further states that this allowance of intentional misuse 
of the law’s protective provisions creates a great risk that respect for IHL will 
Hostilities’ Interpretive Guidance” 42 International Law and Politics (2010) 641, at 680. 
24 Dinstein, “Direct Participation in Hostilities” 18 Tilburg L. Rev. (2013) 3, at 9, 11.
25 Van Der Toorn, supra note 18, at 24. 
26 Dinstein, supra note 24, at 11. 
27 ICRC, Summary Report of the Second Expert Meeting on the Notion of Direct Participation 
in Hostilities (25 / 26 October 2004), at 6, available at https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/
files/other/2004-07-report-dph-2004-icrc.pdf (last visited 30 December 2015); ICRC, 
Summary Report of the Fourth Expert Meeting on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities (27 / 28 November 2006), at 44, available at https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/
files/other/2006-03-report-dph-2006-icrc.pdf (last visited 30 December 2015); ICRC, 
Summary Report of the Fifth Expert Meeting on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities (5 / 6 February 2008), at 70, available at https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/
other/2008-05-report-dph-2008-icrc.pdf (last visited 30 December 2015).
28 ICRC, Interpretative Guidance, supra note 2, at 56.
29 Idem, at 57. 
30 Schmitt, supra note 4, at 32.
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be undermined.31 Therefore, if a party to the conflict can determine that 
persons are posing as human shields voluntarily, their act should be deemed 
qualifying as DPH regardless of the physical or legal character of the obstacle. 
Attention should be paid to whether there is a sufficient reasonable ground 
indicating the voluntariness of human shields. In cases of doubt, participants 
must be treated as involuntary human shields and remain protected civilians. 
Therefore, an attack on a military objective that is shielded involuntarily by 
civilians would only be possible if incidental loss (in other words collateral 
damage) would not exceed the anticipated military advantage. According to 
the author, the threshold of excessive collateral damage should be higher 
in this situation as involuntary human shields are resorted in order to take 
military advantage via violating IHL.32 It should lastly be noted that the term 
‘excessive’ implies a higher threshold than ‘extensive’ or ‘disproportionate’. 
C. Belligerent nexus
According to the Interpretative Guidance, the belligerent nexus 
requirement would be satisfied if an act, which meets the first two criteria, 
was “specifically designed in support of a party to an armed conflict and to the 
detriment of another”.33 First of all, as Schmitt indicates,34 the term “and” used 
in the statement of the ICRC should be altered to the term “or” because it is 
possible to conduct an attack against one party without intending to assist its 
opponent. Secondly, although it is stated in the Interpretative Guidance that 
the determination of the belligerent nexus is related to the objective purpose 
of the act, it would still be not expectable from a reasonable commander in 
practice as has been indicated in the Interpretative Guidance.35 The focus, 
therefore, should be on whether the conduct is objectively capable of 
inflicting harm either depriving a party to the conflict of certain advantages or 
promoting the military efforts of another. Consequently, the criterion should 
be interpreted widely and from the perspective of the person called on to 
make the determination of the belligerent nexus by considering information 
reasonably available to him. 
III. Duration of direct participation in hostilities
According to the Interpretative Guidance, the duration of DPH covers 
31 Idem, at 33. 
32 For an in-depth analysis on voluntary human shields, see Lyall, “Voluntary Human Shields, 
Direct Participation in Hostilities and the International Humanitarian Law Obligations of 
States”, 9 Melb. J. Int’l L. (2008) 313. 
33 ICRC, Interpretative Guidance, supra note 2, at 58.
34 Schmitt, supra note 4, at 34. 
35 ICRC, Interpretative Guidance, supra note 2, at 63.
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the entire period of a specific act that is beyond the phase of its immediate 
execution. It starts with preparatory measures and lasts during the deployment 
to, and the return from, the location of its execution.36 For instance, a farmer 
will be directly participating in hostilities while he is on his way to plant an IED 
and is returning from doing so.
According to Article 51 (3) AP I and Article 13 (3) AP II, civilians enjoy 
full immunity from direct attacks unless (material aspect) and for such 
time (temporal aspect) they directly participate in hostilities. However, 
the Interpretative Guidance was not content with this customary rule and 
introduced the new concept of the “revolving door”.37 According to this, an 
individual will enjoy protection after each specific act even though he commits 
the same act on a regular basis.38 For instance, if the farmer goes to plant 
IED every single night, the Interpretative Guidance says that he still enjoys 
protection after completing each specific act. However, the conduct should 
be considered as a whole, rather than specific acts. Otherwise, as Von Der 
Toorn rightly stated,39 the farmer in our example would be in the privileged 
position of being able to continually change his status in a manner that is 
not in accordance with the spirit of IHL. Consequently, as has been indicated 
by Boothby,40 an individual who commits specific attacks on a recurring basis 
loses protection not only during the entire period of the specific act, but also 
on a continuous basis unless there is an overt renunciation of participation in 
hostilities. The form of renunciation may vary depending on the circumstances 
and it may appear as unambiguous opting out, an affirmative act of withdrawal 
or extended nonparticipation. In conclusion, the revolving door approach that 
is introduced in the Interpretative Guidance is not in accordance with treaty 
law and customary IHL.
IV. Conclusion
The Interpretative Guidance itself provides that the notion of DPH must 
be understood in accordance with interpretation rule found in Article 31 (1) 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties41, as the concept is not clearly 
defined in treaty law or clarified through state practice and international 
jurisprudence.42 Contrary to this, the ICRC seems to be endeavoring to 
create law in its Interpretative Guidance by introducing new concepts such 
36 Idem, at 65.
37 Idem, at 70.
38 Idem, at 71.
39 Van Der Toorn, supra note 18, at 15. 
40 Boothby, supra note 22, at 162.
41 1155 UNTS 331. 
42 ICRC, Interpretative Guidance, supra note 2, at 27.
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as “continuous combat function”, “one causal step”, and “revolving door” 
which do not exist in treaty law or customary IHL. In addition, its treatment 
of some specific issues such as voluntary human shields and the assembly 
of IEDs will most probably be rejected by States that engage in conflict on a 
frequent or intense scale. Therefore, the Interpretative Guidance interprets 
the notion of DPH in favor of non-State organized armed groups in a manner 
that States will never agree to. One may claim that the Interpretative 
Guidance strives to interpret the notion of DPH from the perspective of 
equity and therefore benefits non-State organized armed groups. However, 
as has been indicated by Pirim,43 since the scope and consequences of 
equity is ambiguous, it cannot be seen as a source of international law. 
Furthermore, the Interpretative Guidance does not correctly maintain the 
balance between military necessity and humanitarian concerns. Therefore, 
as has been explained above in the light of scholarly critiques, it can be 
concluded that the Interpretative Guidance does not correctly reflect treaty 
law and customary IHL in the matter of DPH. 
♦♦♦♦
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